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Evidence	 shows	 that	 manipulating	 the	 expressive	 component	 of	 fear	 can	 influence	 the	
processing	 of	 emotional	 information.	 Participants	 unobtrusively	 produced	 the	 expressive	
behaviors	 typical	 of	 fear,	 anger	 or	 happiness.	 Participants	 producing	 the	 expression	 of	
fear	 were	 faster	 at	 classifying	 verbal	 material	 with	 emotional	 content	 than	 participants	
producing	the	expressions	of	happiness	or	anger.	These	effects	were	especially	pronounced	
for	participants	who	were	generally	sensitive	to	their	own	bodily	cues,	as	indicated	by	their	
degree	of	 field-dependence	measured	by	 the	Rod-and-Frame	Task	 (Witkin	&	Asch,	 1948).	
The	results	suggest	that	one	way	of	eliciting	the	cognitive	consequences	of	fear	is	by	inducing	
the	embodied	expressive	behavior.	
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Emotional	 processes	 are	 fundamentally	 “embodied.”	 Bodily	 processes	 such	
as	 expressive	 behaviors	 and	 physiological	 changes	 are	 central	 components	 of	
the	 subjective	 experience	 of	 emotion.	 Following	William	 James	 (1890),	many	
modern	theories	of	emotion	go	further	and	propose	that	bodily	activities	are	the	
causes	of	 emotional	 feelings.	Many	 studies	 (see	Cappella,	1993,	 for	 a	 review)	
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indeed	 support	 the	 notion	 that	 feeling	 states	 can	 be	 induced	 by	 changes	 in	
people’s	 bodily	 activities.	 For	 example,	 people	 who	 adopt	 facial	 expressions	
of	emotions	often	report	feeling	the	corresponding	emotion	(e.g.,	Duclos	et	al.,	
1989;	Laird,	1974),	and	these	effects	can	persist	over	extended	periods	of	time	
(Schnall	&	Laird,	2003).	Similarly,	 adopting	a	posture	can	 result	 in	 emotional	
feelings,	such	as	fear,	anger,	or	sadness	(Duclos	et	al.,	1989).	
However,	 some	 of	 this	work	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 relying	 on	 self-reports,	
and	for	being	confounded	by	experimental	demand	characteristics	(Tourangeau	
&	Ellsworth,	1979).	Furthermore,	although	effects	of	emotional	expressions	on	
subjective	 feelings	have	been	documented	extensively,	 it	 is	unclear	as	 to	what	
extent	 specific	 emotional	 expressions	 influence	 the	 cognitive	 processing	 of	
emotional	content.	
The	cognitive	consequences	of	 fear	and	anxiety	have	been	well	documented	
(Mathews	 &	 MacLeod,	 1994).	 Chronic	 states	 of	 anxiety	 are	 associated	 with	
heightened	 sensitivity	 to	 fear-relevant	 information,	 including	 threatening	
information	 (MacLeod	 &	 Mathews,	 1988;	 Richards	 &	 French,	 1992),	 and	
generally	emotional	information	(Fox,	Russo,	&	Dutton,	2002;	Martin,	Williams,	
&	Clark,	1991).	Whereas	 this	cognitive	bias	has	been	repeatedly	demonstrated	
for	 clinically	 anxious	 samples,	 the	 findings	 have	 been	 less	 conclusive	 when	
inducing	temporary	states	of	fear	in	nonclinical	samples.	For	example,	Riemann	
and	McNally	 (1995)	 induced	 elation	 and	 anxiety	 using	 a	 film,	 and	 presented	
an	 attentional	 task	 with	 words	 varying	 in	 emotionality	 and	 personal	 concern.	
Contrary	to	prediction,	no	effects	of	the	mood	induction	were	found,	presumably	
because	the	mood	change	was	not	maintained	throughout	the	experiment.	
Rather	than	using	films	or	other	ways	of	inducing	mood,	in	this	study	we	used	
a	different	way	of	accessing	the	cognitive	consequences	of	fear,	manipulating	the	
embodied	component	of	fear.	Recent	theories	of	embodiment	(e.g.,	Niedenthal,	
Barsalou,	 Winkielman,	 Krauth-Gruber,	 &	 Ric,	 2005)	 have	 suggested	 that	
simulating	 certain	 aspects	 of	 an	 experience	 (e.g.,	 the	 expressive	 behavior	 of	
an	 emotion)	 can	 invoke	 the	 cognitive	 concept	 of	 that	 experience.	 Thus,	 we	
tested	whether	 or	 not	 a	 fearful	 expression	 can	 produce	 some	 of	 the	 cognitive	
consequences	of	fear.	
Reaction	 time	 tasks	 requiring	 fast	 responses	are	often	used	 to	assess	aspects	
of	 cognitive	 processing	 that	 are	 not	 accessible	 to	 self-reports.	 For	 example,	
modifications	of	 the	classic	Stroop	 task	have	demonstrated	 that	people	exhibit	
attentional	 biases	 towards	 noncolor	 words	 that	 are	 personally	 meaningful.	
Specifically,	patients	with	emotional	disorders	 show	greater	 response	 latencies	
for	 naming	 the	 ink	 color	 of	 words	 relevant	 to	 their	 clinical	 condition	 (see	
Williams,	Mathews,	&	MacLeod,	1996,	for	a	review).	The	Implicit	Associations	
Test	(IAT)	also	measures	a	person’s	automatic	associations	with	certain	groups	of	
stimuli,	therefore	indicating	implicit	cognitive	preferences	(Greenwald,	McGhee,	
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&	Schwartz,	1998).	Furthermore,	lexical	decision	tasks	have	been	used	in	classic	
psycholinguistic	 studies	 to	 capture	 attentional	 biases	 toward	 certain	 types	 of	
information	(e.g.,	Meyer	&	Schvaneveldt,	1971).
In	 the	 current	 study,	 performance	 on	 a	 sentence	 classification	 task	 was	
compared	for	participants	producing	expressions	of	 fear,	happiness,	and	anger.	
The	 stimuli	 were	 word-strings	 forming	 emotional	 sentences	 (related	 to	 fear,	
happiness,	 and	 anger)	 and	 neutral	 sentences,	 and	 the	 participants’	 task	was	 to	
indicate	whether	a	word-string	formed	an	English	sentence	or	not.
We	predicted	that	participants	with	a	fear	expression	would	be	faster	to	classify	
stimuli	that	were	of	relevance	to	the	primed	embodied	state	of	fear.	This	effect	
could	manifest	itself	in	one	of	two	ways:	The	fear	expression	might	produce	an	
effect	for	fearful	material,	but	not	for	other	(e.g.,	happy)	emotional	material.	In	
contrast,	 the	 fearful	 expression	might	 enhance	 vigilance	 toward	all	 emotional	
sentences,	similar	to	the	findings	in	the	literature	on	clinical	anxiety	(Fox	et	al.,	
2002;	Martin	et	al.,	1991).	
IndIvIdual dIfferences: fIeld-dependence
Previous	 research	 has	 demonstrated	 individual	 differences	 in	 the	 degree	 to	
which	 people’s	 emotions	 are	 “embodied.”	 For	 example,	 some	 people	 report	
feeling	happy	when	 they	are	 induced	 to	put	on	a	smile,	whereas	others	do	not	
(Laird	 &	 Crosby,	 1974).	 This	 difference	 in	 response	 to	 bodily	 cues	 is	 stable	
over	 time	and	consistent	across	a	wide	variety	of	behaviors	and	 feelings	 (e.g.,	
Schnall,	 Abrahamson,	 &	 Laird,	 2002;	 Schnall	 &	 Laird,	 2003).	 To	 provide	 a	
measure	of	 individual	differences	 in	bodily	sensitivity	 that	was	 independent	of	
facial	expressions,	we	assessed	field-dependence.	In	general,	individuals	who	are	
field-dependent	rely	on	contextual	cues	from	the	situation,	outside	their	bodies,	
whereas	 individuals	 who	 are	 field-independent	 rely	 more	 on	 internal,	 bodily	
cues.	 Earlier	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 field-independent	 individuals	 are	 more	
responsive	to	manipulations	of	their	facial	expressions	(Duncan	&	Laird,	1977).	
The	Rod-and-Frame	Task	 (Witkin	&	Asch,	 1948)	 is	 one	of	 the	most	 common	
measures	of	field-dependence.	For	this	task,	the	participant	sits	in	a	completely	
dark	 room	 and	 is	 presented	 with	 a	 luminous	 rod	 surrounded	 by	 a	 luminous	
frame	 tilted	 to	 the	 left	 or	 to	 the	 right.	 The	 rod	 can	 be	 moved	 independently	
from	the	frame,	and	the	participant’s	task	is	to	adjust	the	rod	to	make	it	appear	
completely	 vertical.	 Field-dependence	 is	measured	 as	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	
participant	either	relies	on	external	cues	from	the	contextual	frame,	rather	than	
from	 cues	 of	 her	 own	 body,	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	 number	 of	 degrees	 that	 the	
participants’	perception	deviates	from	the	true	vertical.	Our	prediction	was	that	
the	experimental	manipulation	of	producing	“embodied”	facial	expressions	and	
postures	should	be	more	effective	for	participants	who	are	field-independent,	and	
thus	sensitive	to	internal	bodily	cues.
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Overall,	 the	 objective	 was	 to	 investigate	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 expressive	
behavior	 of	 fear	 on	 emotional	 information	 processing,	 which	 could	 result	 in	
either	 a	 specific	 effect	 for	 fear-relevant	 information,	 or	 a	 general	 effect	 for	
any	 emotional	 information.	 Individual	 differences	 in	 field-dependence	 were	
hypothesized	to	moderate	the	effect	of	fearful	expressions	on	the	processing	of	
emotion-related	material.	
method
OvervIew
Participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	 three	experimental	conditions	
in	which	they	adopted	the	expressive	behavior	of	fear,	happiness,	or	anger.	An	
elaborate	cover	story	was	administered	to	ensure	that	participants	were	not	aware	
that	producing	an	emotional	expression	was	the	focus	of	the	experiment.	While	
producing	the	expressions,	participants	completed	a	sentence	classification	task	
involving	 emotion	 metaphors.	 Participants	 producing	 a	 fear	 expression	 were	
expected	to	show	greater	facilitation,	and	thus	faster	response	times,	when	making	
sentence	classifications	of	stimuli	relevant	to	fear.	Individuals	who	were,	in	the	
Rod-and-Frame	Task,	identified	to	be	relatively	responsive	to	bodily	cues	were	
expected	to	show	more	pronounced	effects	of	the	experimental	manipulation.	
partIcIpants
Sixty-two	 undergraduate	 students	 (41	 females)	 identifying	 themselves	 as	
native	speakers	of	English	participated	for	$7	in	compensation.	The	age	of	 the	
participants	ranged	between	18	and	22,	with	a	mean	of	19.45	years.	Equipment	
failure	occurred	for	one	male,	whose	data	were	excluded	from	analyses.
stImulI
The	 stimuli	 consisted	 of	 12	 metaphors	 each	 describing	 fear	 (e.g.,	 “she	
was	 frozen	 in	 her	 tracks”),	 happiness	 (e.g.,	 “she	was	 flying	 high”)	 and	 anger	
(e.g.,	 “he	 flew	 off	 the	 handle”),	 selected	 from	 linguistic	 studies	 of	 metaphor	
(Kövecses,	 2000;	 Lakoff	 &	 Johnson,	 1980).	 Emotion	 metaphors	 were	 used	
because	they	do	not	contain	explicit	emotion	words,	and	were	less	likely	to	direct	
participants’	attention	to	the	real	purpose	of	the	study.	Also,	emotion	metaphors	
are	hypothesized	to	have	a	bodily	basis	(Lakoff	&	Johnson,	1980):	Phrases	such	
as	“getting	cold	feet”	when	feeling	afraid,	or	“getting	hot	under	the	collar”	when	
feeling	 angry,	 are	 hypothesized	 to	 reflect	 physiological	 changes	 during	 those	
feelings,	 such	 as	 a	 decrease	 in	 skin	 temperature	 for	 fear,	 and	 an	 increase	 for	
anger.	Because	we	manipulated	bodily	cues,	it	seemed	especially	appropriate	to	
use	“embodied”	emotion	metaphors.	
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All	metaphors	 were	 pretested	 to	 ensure	 comprehensibility,	 and	matched	 for	
number	 of	 letters,	 sentence	 length	 and	 word	 frequencies.	 For	 standardization	
purposes,	 all	 expressions	 were	 transformed	 into	 third-person,	 past	 tense	
statements.	Sentences	had	the	basic	form	of	“pronoun	(he/she)	+	verb	+	object.”	
Twelve	 neutral	 nonmetaphorical	 sentences	 were	 constructed	 by	 replacing	 one	
word	of	an	emotion	metaphor	with	a	word	of	equal	or	higher	word	frequency.	
For	instance,	“she	snapped	at	him”	(anger	metaphor)	was	transformed	into	“she	
glanced	 at	 him”	 (control	 sentence).	 Thus,	 there	 were	 48	 different	 stimuli:	 36	
emotion	metaphors	 (12	 for	 each	 emotion	 category)	 and	 12	 control	 sentences.	
Word	frequencies	did	not	differ	across	word	types,	F(3,	47)	=	.25,	p	<	.86.
Forty-eight	nonsentences	were	constructed	by	pseudorandomly	combining	the	
words	that	formed	the	target	stimuli	(e.g.	“she	him	snapped	at”),	and	were	used	
as	filler	items.	
prOcedure
Participants	came	into	the	laboratory	individually	for	a	study	on	the	“influence	
of	 cranial	 nerve	 activity	 on	 cognition.”	 Instructions	 indicated	 that	 contracting	
certain	muscles	would	activate	the	cranial	nerve	system,	and	as	a	consequence,	
might	improve	cognitive	functioning.	
After	 providing	 informed	 consent	 and	 some	 demographic	 information,	
participants	filled	out	a	list	of	emotion	rating	scales	for	a	baseline	measurement	
of	emotional	feelings.	Items	on	the	scale	were	relaxed, angry, happy, sad, afraid, 
depressed, upset,	 and	 confused,	 and	 each	 had	 a	 4¼-inch-long	 line	 next	 to	 it,	
labeled	don’t feel at all	 and	 feel very strongly	 at	 either	 end.	 Participants	were	
asked	to	describe	their	feelings	at	the	moment	by	marking	an	“X”	on	the	part	of	
the	line	that	best	described	how	strongly	each	emotion	was	felt.	
Participants	 were	 then	 presented	 with	 word-strings	 on	 the	 computer	 and	
indicated	whether	 or	 not	 they	 formed	 an	English	 sentence	 by	 pressing	 one	 of	
two	keys.	It	was	emphasized	to	work	as	quickly	as	possible,	but	to	not	sacrifice	
accuracy	for	speed.	Stimuli	were	presented	at	the	center	of	a	computer	screen,	in	
lower-case	letters	in	Verdana	font,	point-size	30,	on	a	light	gray	background,	and	
remained	on	the	screen	until	the	response	was	made.	The	Inter-Stimulus-Interval	
was	2	seconds.	After	having	pressed	the	key,	the	participant	rested	his/her	index	
finger	on	a	black	button	directly	below	the	“yes”	and	“no”	keys	while	waiting	for	
the	next	stimulus	to	appear	on	the	screen.	Each	participant	received	a	different	
random	order	of	the	experimental	stimuli.	Response	latencies	were	measured	by	
the	 computer	 beginning	with	 the	 onset	 of	 each	 phrase,	 and	measurement	was	
terminated	once	the	participant	pressed	the	correct	button.	
Each	participant	 first	 received	12	practice	 sentences	 to	get	 familiar	with	 the	
procedure.	After	 this	 practice	 trial	 block,	 the	 participant	was	 informed	 that	 in	
order	to	improve	performance	on	the	task,	certain	cranial	nerve	exercises	would	
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be	 performed.	 The	 experimenter	 read	 the	 instructions	 to	 the	 participant	 and	
pointed	out	specific	muscles	on	an	anatomical	chart	while	monitoring	whether	
the	correct	muscle	contractions	were	produced.	Instructions	for	the	contractions	
were	 based	 on	 previous	 studies	 (e.g.,	 Duclos	 et	 al.,	 1989;	 Schnall	 &	 Laird,	
2003),	and	were	given	until	the	participant	succeeded	at	producing	the	desired	
expressions.	
For	 the	 “Fear”	 expression,	 instructions	 were	 to	 raise	 the	 eyebrows	 while	
moving	 the	head	back,	 and	 letting	 the	mouth	 relax	and	hang	open	a	 little.	To	
accomplish	a	 fearful	posture,	participants	were	asked	 to	 sit	 at	 the	edge	of	 the	
chair,	 draw	 the	 feet	 underneath	 the	 chair,	 and	 lean	 the	 upper	 body	 slightly	
backwards.
For	the	“Happiness”	expression,	instructions	were	to	push	the	corners	of	the	
mouth	up	and	back	while	opening	the	mouth	a	little.	Participants	were	also	asked	
to	sit	up	straight	 in	 the	chair	and	place	 the	nondominant	hand	on	 the	armrest,	
while	the	legs	were	straight	in	front,	with	knees	bent,	and	feet	right	below	the	
knees.
For	the	“Anger”	expression,	instructions	were	to	push	the	eyebrows	down	and	
together	while	pressing	the	lips	together.	At	the	same	time,	participants	placed	
the	feet	flat	on	the	floor	directly	below	the	knees,	leaned	slightly	forward,	and	
clenched	their	nondominant	hand	to	make	a	tight	fist.	
The	participant	was	asked	to	maintain	the	muscle	contractions	while	working	
on	the	sentence	classification	task.	It	was	pointed	out	that	if	the	contractions	felt	
uncomfortable	at	 any	point,	 they	 should	be	 released	a	 little,	 and	 should	never	
feel	painful	in	any	way.	The	96	stimuli	(48	sentences	and	48	filler	items)	were	
presented	in	6	blocks	of	16	trials	each,	and	in	between	blocks,	the	participant	was	
asked	to	relax	the	muscles	and	to	stretch	a	little,	to	avoid	the	muscle	contractions	
from	becoming	too	strenuous.	
To	 obtain	 a	measurement	 of	 emotional	 feelings	 before	 and	 after	 producing	
expressions,	a	second	set	of	rating	scales	(the	same	as	for	the	baseline	rating)	was	
given	after	participants	completed	the	sentence	classification	task.
Subsequently,	to	account	for	individual	differences	regarding	a	person’s	focus	
on	internal	vs.	external	cues,	field-dependence	was	assessed	using	the	Rod-and-
Frame	Task.	The	participant	was	escorted	to	a	different	room	that	was	completely	
darkened.	While	blind-folded,	the	participant	was	seated	in	a	chair	placed	eight	
feet	away	from	an	illuminated	frame	with	a	rod	in	the	middle.	The	experimenter	
tilted	the	frame	28°	to	either	the	right	or	the	left,	and	also	independently	tilted	the	
rod	28°	to	either	the	right	or	the	left.	Then	the	participant	was	asked	to	remove	
the	blind-fold,	and	the	experimenter	slowly	rotated	the	rod	until	the	participant	
judged	 its	 position	 to	 be	 completely	 vertical.	 Twelve	 counterbalanced	 trials	
were	administered,	and	deviations	(measured	in	degrees)	from	the	vertical	were	
recorded.	Finally,	 in	 a	postexperimental	 questionnaire	participants	were	 asked	
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about	 their	 difficulty	 in	 producing	 the	muscle	 contractions,	 on	 a	 rating	 scale	
ranging	from	1	(very easy)	to	5	(very difficult).	Then	participants	were	debriefed	
and	dismissed.
results
fIeld-dependence
The	 individual	 difference	 variable	 of	 field-dependence	 was	 computed	 by	
adding	the	Rod-and-Frame	Task	error	scores	for	each	participant,	and	computing	
absolute	mean	errors.	Boxplots	of	Rod-and-Frame	measurements	were	examined	
for	each	participant,	and	errors	beyond	3	box	lengths	from	the	upper	or	 lower	
edge	 of	 the	 box	 were	 excluded.	 Because	 the	 resulting	 scores	 were	 roughly	
normally	distributed	and	no	natural	break	point	was	identified	by	inspecting	the	
histogram,	 a	median	 split	was	 performed	 to	 categorize	 participants	 into	 those	
that	were	field-dependent	and	field-independent.	
sentence classIfIcatIOn task
Errors	on	the	sentence	classification	task	were	excluded	and	replaced	by	the	
mean	for	 that	 stimulus.	 In	order	 to	 reduce	 the	 impact	of	outliers,	and	because	
the	data	were	positively	skewed,	all	reaction	times	were	log-transformed.	Mean	
response	latencies	were	computed	for	each	sentence	type	(fear,	happiness,	anger,	
control).	In	order	to	account	for	individual	differences	in	overall	speed,	control	
sentences	were	used	as	a	covariate	 in	 the	analysis.	To	 justify	 this,	an	ANOVA	
with	 Expression	 Condition	 (Fear,	 Happiness,	Anger)	 as	 independent	 variable	
and	control	sentences	as	dependent	variable	confirmed	that	the	three	expression	
conditions	did	not	differ	 in	 their	 response	 to	 the	control	sentences,	F(2,	56)	=	
.71,	p	<	.49.	
Mean	response	latencies	of	the	three	emotional	sentence	types	(fearful,	angry,	
happy	sentences)	were	submitted	to	an	ANCOVA	with	sentence	type	as	within-
subjects	 factor,	 control	 sentences	 as	 covariate,	 and	 expression	 condition	 (fear,	
happiness,	anger)	and	field-dependence	as	between-subjects	factors.	
A	 significant	 main	 effect	 of	 condition	 showed	 that	 the	 expression	 groups	
indeed	differed	when	correctly	classifying	emotional	sentences,	F(2,	55)	=	3.20,	
p	<	.05	(see	Figure	1	for	means).	
Planned	comparisons	further	showed	that	the	fear	condition	was	significantly	
faster	 than	 the	 happiness	 condition,	F(1,	 55)	 =	 4.69,	 p	 <	 .03,	 and	 the	 anger	
condition,	F(1,	55)	=	4.95,	p	<	.03,	whereas	the	reaction	times	in	the	latter	two	
conditions	did	not	differ	(p	>	.95).	
There	 was	 also	 a	 significant	 effect	 of	 metaphor	 type,	 F(2,	 112)	 =	 31.68,	
p	<	.0001,	with	fastest	reaction	times	for	fear	metaphors,	relative	to	happiness	
metaphors,	F(1,	56)	=	23.01,	p	<	.0001,	and	anger	metaphors,	F(1,	56)	=	72.39,	
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p	 <	 .0001.	 Finally,	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 interaction	 for	 Field-Dependence	
and	Metaphor	Type,	F(2,	 112)	 =	 3.00,	p	 <	 .05,	 and	 a	marginal	 interaction	 of	
Condition	and	Metaphor	Type,	F(4,	112)	=	2.28,	p	<	.07.	There	was	no	three-way	
interaction	for	Field-Dependence,	Condition	and	Metaphor	Type.
The	 prediction	 that	 field-independent	 individuals	 show	 more	 pronounced	
effects	 of	 the	 experimental	manipulation	was	 then	 tested	 using	 simple	 effects	
analyses,	as	recommended	by	Keppel	(1991,	p.	112).	Indeed,	field-independent	
participants	in	the	fear	expression	condition	(M	=	3.18,	SD =	.14	log	ms)	were	
significantly	 faster	 than	 field-dependent	 participants	 in	 the	 fear	 expression	
condition	(M	=	3.29,	SD	=	.08	log	ms),	F(1,	55)	=	5.44,	p	<	.02.	In	addition,	field-
independent	individuals	in	the	fear	condition	were	faster	than	field-independent	
individuals	in	both	the	happiness	expression	condition	(M	=	3.26,	SD	=	.08	log	
ms),	F(1,	55)	=	7.13,	p	<	.01,	and	the	anger	expression	condition	(M	=	3.32,	SD	
=	.11	log	ms),	F(1,	55)	=	7.31,	p	<	.01.	
Thus,	 we	 found	 that	 producing	 the	 bodily	 expressions	 associated	with	 fear	
led	 to	 a	more	 rapid	 processing	 of	 sentences	 not	 only	 related	 to	 fear,	 but	 also	
sentences	 with	 other	 emotional	 content.	 Consistent	 with	 previous	 work	 (e.g.,	
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Figure 1.	Mean	reaction	times	for	all	participants.	Error	bars	show	standard	errors	of	the	mean.
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Schnall	&	Laird,	 2003),	 the	 effect	was	 especially	 pronounced	 for	 individuals	
who	generally	rely	on	bodily	cues,	namely	field-independent	participants.	
dIffIculty Of prOducIng the expressIOns
A	potential	confounding	factor	was	differences	in	the	difficulty	of	the	muscle	
contractions	across	the	expression	conditions.	To	test	this	possibility,	the	rating	
for	reported	difficulty	of	producing	the	expression	was	analyzed	in	a	one-way	
ANOVA	with	expression	condition	as	factor.	The	three	conditions	did	not	differ,	
F(2,	58)	=.64,	p	<	.53.	Thus,	reported	difficulty	of	producing	the	expressions	is	
unlikely	to	account	for	the	reported	findings.
self-repOrts Of emOtIOnal feelIngs
Pre-	and	posttest	ratings	of	emotional	feelings	were	examined	for	changes	in	
reported	feelings	with	repeated-measures	ANOVAs	with	pre-	and	posttest	rating	
for	 each	 emotion	 adjective,	 and	 Expression	 Condition	 and	 Field-Dependence	
as	 factors.	Contrary	 to	 expectation,	 there	was	 no	 significant	 interaction	 effect	
for	 reported	 changes	 in	 ratings	 of	 feeling	 afraid	 and	 Expression	 Condition,	
F(2,	55)	=	.43,	p	<	.66,	nor	a	three-way	interaction	of	Feeling,	Expression	and	
Field-Dependence,	F(2,	 55)	=	 .15,	p	 <	 .86.	No	other	 emotion	 ratings	 showed	
significant	changes	dependent	on	Expression	Condition,	nor	any	other	three-way	
interactions,	all	ps	>	.12.
discussion
Overall,	the	results	from	this	experiment	support	the	notion	that	the	mere	facial	
expression	 of	 fear	 can	 be	 sufficient	 to	 influence	 the	 processing	 of	 emotional	
information.	These	effects	were	obtained	on	all emotional	material	independent	
of	specific	emotional	content,	not	only	on	fear-specific	stimuli,	consistent	with	
previous	reports	on	the	clinical	literature	of	anxiety	(Fox	et	al.,	2002;	Martin	et	
al.,	1991).	Perhaps	when	a	person	is	in	the	vigilant	state	that	accompanies	fear,	
any	emotional	material	is	potentially	relevant,	such	that	negative	cues	signal	the	
possibility	of	danger,	whereas	positive	cues	signal	the	absence	thereof.	
Several	 additional	 aspects	 of	 the	 findings	 are	 noteworthy.	 First,	 the	 effects	
were	specific	to	the	fear	expression	condition,	and	did	not	extend	to	the	anger	
expression	condition.	Thus,	it	was	not	the	case	that	any	kind	of	negative	bodily	
expression	 resulted	 in	 a	 cognitive	 bias.	 Second,	 no	 changes	 in	 participants’	
emotional	 feelings	as	 reported	before	and	after	 the	experimental	manipulation	
were	found,	suggesting	the	possibility	that	the	results	were	produced	by	the	bodily	
cues	directly,	rather	than	being	mediated	by	feelings.	And	third,	as	predicted,	the	
effects	depended	on	whether	or	not	a	person	was	relatively	sensitive	to	bodily	
states.	 Field-independent	 individuals	 showed	 a	 more	 pronounced	 facilitation	
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effect	 of	 the	 fearful	 expression	 than	 did	 field-dependent	 individuals.	 Thus,	
consistent	with	 previous	 studies,	 it	 seems	 some	 people	 pay	more	 attention	 to	
their	own	bodily	cues	and	are	more	influenced	by	experimental	manipulations	
of	those	bodily	cues	(Schnall	&	Laird,	2003).	
the rOle Of feelIngs
At	a	first	glance	it	seems	surprising	that	there	was	no	evidence	for	a	mediating	
role	 of	 subjective	 feelings	 on	 effects	 of	 information	 processing.	 Participants’	
self-reports	before	and	after	the	experimental	manipulation	did	not	differ.	More	
specifically,	participants	in	the	fear	expression	condition	did	not	report	feeling	
more	 afraid,	 nor	 did	 participants	 in	 the	 happiness	 expression	 condition	 report	
feeling	happier.	These	results	seem	at	odds	with	previous	studies	 that	did	find	
effects	of	producing	expressive	behaviors	on	self-reported	feelings	(e.g.,	Duclos	
et	al.,	1989;	Laird,	1974).	
How	 can	 this	 apparent	 discrepancy	 be	 explained?	 Perhaps	 the	 effects	were	
not	 due	 to	 induced	 feelings,	 but	 instead	 were	 caused	 directly	 by	 the	 bodily	
expressions.	 Indeed,	 some	 authors	 argue	 that	 affective	 expressions,	 as	 one	
instantiation	 of	 affect,	 can	 have	 similar	 cognitive	 consequences	 as	 other	
affective	 cues	 (Clore	 &	 Colcombe,	 2003).	 Supportive	 evidence	 comes	 from	
demonstrations	 that	 the	 smiles	 and	 frowns	 of	 politicians	 (Ottati	 et	 al.,	 1997)	
and	colors	perceived	as	happy	and	sad	(Soldat	&	Sinclair,	2001)	can	have	the	
same	effects	as	moods.	Like	affective	feelings,	embodied	expressions	are	repre-
sentations	of	value,	that	is,	of	goodness	and	badness.	Although	bodily	cues	can	
induce	mood	under	certain	circumstances,	they	may	also	be	considered	within	a	
broader	view,	recognizing	that	multiple	representations	of	affective	meaning	can	
each	have	similar	effects	(cf.	Clore	&	Schnall,	2005).	
“embOdIed” emOtIOns
As	 noted	 earlier,	 we	 used	 “embodied”	 metaphors	 with	 the	 objective	 of	
investigating	 whether	 or	 not	 manipulating	 embodied	 emotional	 expressions	
would	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 cognitive	 processes.	 The	 present	 study	 is,	 to	 our	
knowledge,	one	of	the	first	studies	to	use	embodied	metaphors,	while	at	the	same	
time	experimentally	manipulating	aspects	of	embodiment.	Theories	of	embodied 
cognition have	at	their	core	the	assumption	that	a	great	deal	of	abstract	thought	
is	structured	and	constrained	by	bodily	concepts	(e.g.,	Gibbs,	1994;	Kövecses,	
2000;	Lakoff	&	Johnson,	1980).	The	current	research	was	designed	within	the	
framework	of	 this	 embodied	perspective	 and	borrowed	 the	 assumptions	of	 an	
embodied	 approach	 to	 cognition	 and	 its	 metaphorical	 expressions.	We	 found	
experimental	 evidence	 that	online	emotional	processing,	objectively	measured	
by	reaction	times	rather	than	self-reports,	can	be	influenced	by	a	person’s	bodily	
expression	 of	 an	 emotion.	Our	 results	 suggest	 that	 cognitive	 consequences	 of	
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fear	are	elicited	when	the	particular	instantiations	of	the	emotion	are	embodied	
expressions	rather	than	feelings.	
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